Charles Taylor, The philosopher-citizen:
In our time, we can almost fear that the public intellectual is an endangered species. On the one hand, the role can be trivialized by the proliferation of collective petitions for fashionable causes which it is very easy to sign. On the other, in the making of policy the intellectual is often replaced by the expert, master of some narrow field, who is rarely asked to decide on the use to be made of his expertise. In this world, Jürgen Habermas stands out as a shining example of the philosopher-citizen, two roles indissolubly linked in a figure of great depth and integrity. We, in democratic countries and beyond, are all in his debt, and that more than anything else accounts for his unparalleled prominence. He is an inspiration to us all.
Prof, I wonder why all the public intellectuals on this site are silent about the taliban's vicious bombing campaign? Is it because the main target is Peshawar and most intellectuals are from Punjab and Karachi and live in the West and Peshawar is so exotic and far away? Or because its harder to talk about the rage of the oppressed when they are so close to home? I find it hard to imagine that a USAF bombing campaign that targeted civilians in a similar manner would pass without comment for so many days.... btw, the brothers last exploit in Mumbai is the topic of a documentary airing on HBO tonight. Any previews? comments? Just curious.
Yeah, I don't know man. Why are the public intellectuals on this site so damn silent? I am hoping to catch the docu once it is online - read good things about it.
Yes, where are the moderate voices (on this site)?
Omar: the people on this site are also silent about Darfur, sexism, and the Obama Administration -- all subjects that have some bearing on South Asia. What might one infer from such silence? As arguments with people over the years have taught me, not much...
I, for one, resoundingly condemn the silences generated by this blog.
I was being irritable. But Qalandar ji, this bombing business is really an acute problem. A few days ago a friend's uncle (a scholar of Persian) was shot dead in Peshawar by the taliban (he was a shia, working for the Iranian consulate). My friend says his relatives are now asking him for bullet proof jackets from America. And this is only the beginning. If the army has seriously turned against the jihadis then we have a very long fight on our hands; they trained a half a million of them and now they have lost control of them. Its a mess.
Truly tragic. http://afpak.blogspot.com/2009/11/adieu-abul.html I had not seen this news.
I had heard about the Iranian embassy employee being assassinated, sorry to hear he was related to a friend of yours. I was probably a bit irritable in my response too. It's just that there have been reams of discussion on this blog, and I don't think there's been a whiff of soft-on-Taliban sentiment from the vast majority of commenters. However, it is understandable that people often do not feel the need to argue the obvious (hence there are no discussions on this blog for why democracy is better than, e.g., military dictatorship -- I think most CMers assume that there is agreement that it is), hence people might not feel the need to condemn the Taliban. But, to the extent that folks feel that a military solution is not going to be a real solution, and to the extent they feel that this fluid situation is being boiled down to one possibility (the one that seems to shore up the position of the very military that, you yourself concede, is most responsible for the mess), then people might feel like they need to raise their voices against the perceived INEVITABILITY of the response. [Of course, that which is obvious varies from audience to audience; with many people that I meet, I cannot assume that they will all agree that civilian rule/corrupt democracy is better than fauji rule. Hence, what I choose to be silent about will also vary from audience to audience]...
PS-- this bombing business is indeed an acute problem, a near-daily dose of horror that is reminiscent of Baghdad, circa 2006. But even in Baghdad, a military solution alone did not work; I'm not even sure if that was the main reason, or whether it was the generous payments doled out to folks to not fight (and keep their weapons to boot!). So, if an army light-years ahead of Pakistan's as far as funding and training and general professionalism is concerned felt constrained to compromise, is it wise to think that Pakistan can achieve a purely military solution (especially given that at least some in the army apparatus could conceivably have divided loyalties on account of ethnic affiliation, etc.)? Aside: I am greatly dismayed by the vast increase in paranoia and the sense that the violence "must" be the work of "outsiders" in many sections of public opinion in Pakistan. I don't think there is any contradiction between acknowledging the dirty business that geo-politics can and does entail; and mourning the ostrich mentality of so many in the country. And, IMO the military is only too happy to feed this mindset: far better to rally people around its operations in South Waziristan and Swat, rather than have people asking too many questions about just who is responsible, and for what.
Eloquently put, Qalandar. With regards to USAF's humane bombs and Talibothra's human bombs (no jab intended at Omar), and the supposedly different responses to the two: given the legacy of colonialism in South Asia, does it make it difficult to condemn or rant against the bombings with NATO troops in Afghanistan and drones in Pakistan? " British aerial control failed miserably, and regional memory of that past ensures that the strategy raises the spectre of ruthless western imperial ambition — no matter how much US officials protest their altruism." http://www.theopedproject.org/cms/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=126:ft-the-shadow-of-history-passes-over-pakistan&catid=38:successes&Itemid=86
Qalandar, To the extent that the pak army now wants to rein in the jihadis I am sure they use ALL available tools, including offers of money and offers of compromise. (I am not convinced that they want to shut down all the Jihadi terrorist organizations. I think the "India-specific" ones will still get a pass as long as they promise not to explode on this side of the border, in spite of the fact that their members regularly turn up in the ranks of suicide bombers and suchlike) Your post implies that the army has somehow launched a mindless military operation against them and wont listen to reasonable voices asking for compromise. The reverse is true. In this case, the army has bent over backwards to try for some compromise. They also announced their military operations in advance and moved slowly to give them a chance to get out of the way (not out of love necessarily, but because the army anticipated very heavy casaulties in case the TTP had decided to stand and fight). And I am sure they hand out money as well. Their problem is that TTP is not amenable to compromise and is now dominated by hardliners unwilling to follow the military's script. In fact, the army has made new peace deals with Gul Bahadur and Mullah Nazir in spite of the fact that both are likely to be sheltering TTP members and other terrorists. You may be getting your information from Tariq Ali ;) (who is always fun but not always accurate or "fair and balanced").
Omar: You raise a valid point, one that made me realize that my own comment was not very clear. I guess I want to make two points: 1. The Iraq analogy: yes, Pakistan's army might be using multiple tools, but it is going in for a heavy-handed military operation. Precisely the kind of thing the US (apparently) decided wasn't really working after a point and switched gears. The Pakistani army might be using some of the techniques the americans used as well, but they don't seem to be going easy on the force aspect of it. 2. Now, following on from (1), if you are correct about the army bending over backwards, announcing the action in advance, etc., then you should be supporting my point even more: because what you are saying is that the army action is highly cynical, inasmuch as it isn't REALLY aimed at exterminating the TTP, but instead at creating the illusion of decisive action with some limited (but perhaps, in fact likely) valuable gains. The problem with this theater is that the "cost" is presumably borne by the HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS of people who are displaced. i.e. it would be one thing to say: we have to take the TTP out, and refugees are the price one has to pay. We could debate that, but if the story is "let's make it seem like we're doing what we say we are doing", then it seems to me that even the need for debate collapses -- because people are being displaced for nothing, or for very little. [The above comment assumes a dualism that, obviously, doesn't do justice to the complexity of the situation in Pakistan's north-west. But I think it serves to make the point that one can't have it both ways: you can't say that the army action cannot be criticized because it is necessary to defeat the TTP; and then, if someone criticizes the heavy-handedness of the approach, say that it isn't really that heavy-handed because the army isn't aiming at the utter defeat of the TTP...]
Interesting discussion here by Q and Omar; firstly I do want to add my regrets to the loss of life that is happening, esp. regarding Mr.Syed Abul Hasan Jafry, as well as the numerous other civilians caught in the crossfire as it were. But I just want to ask a couple of questions: namely does anybody beleive that the Pakistani military will be able to defeat or elminate any extremist opposition decisively on the battlefield? This seems like a tall order to me, unless it is combined with a political solution, at least in part. And secondly if people beleive such a victory by force of arms is possible, just how much is it going to cost in terms of lives lost and time taken? I would imagine we are talking about a lot more deaths and many more years. This isn't an arguement for not undertaking any military action or measures but just to say that I think it would be difficult to advocate a policy approach that relies on such action as the sole or primary meals of dealing with the situation. One might like to be able to fight these threats mainly through the use of force, but is this a viable solution in the long-term?c
Following on from Conrad's second question, I should add that Pakistan's track record is not good; i.e. not only has it tried to adopt a purely military solution in the face of numerous political "problems", the fact that it has failed in almost* every instance does not seem to have dissuaded the military apparatus from further adventures. Consider the following examples: 1. East Pakistan/Bangladesh: 'nuff said. Catastrophic, both from a human rights perspective, and ultimately unsuccessful even from the perspective of the Pakistani state. 2. Balochistan: Here the military did crush the separatist movement in the 1970s, but the absence of any political movement meant the tensions/issues continued to simmer -- and are now on the boil again. 3. Operation "Clean Up": this was quite astounding, and entailed the Pakistani army moving in to destroy a political party -- the MQM -- in urban Sindh; a quisling version of the MQM ("MQM Haqiqi") was also set up with military backing. Many "muhajirs" were killed (I don't think anyone knows how many, but several hundred would be the lowest figure I would be prepared to accept); again, politically this was a complete and utter failure: not only is the MQM still around (and the Haqiqi basically extinct), it continues to run Karachi, and in fact had the governorship of Sindh itself pursuant to a deal it struck with -- of all dispensations -- Musharraf's military regime. 4. The ongoing actions in Swat and South Waziristan: the jury is out here. *[I say "almost" because of the possibility that the military action in 1983 in Sindh did succeed in crushing armed dissent. I don't know much (anything?) about this, and it's been difficult to get information on exactly what the issues were, etc. Any insight would be greatly appreciated].
Video andtranscript of an interview with Malalai Joya: http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=4503
Qalandar, I too was not clear. I think that there is no political solution that does not involve SOME necessarily nasty military action (not necessarily THIS particular military action, but some very nasty action nonetheless). Here is why I think so: There IS such a thing as a core jihadi network who are determined to impose their vision in Pakistan, in India, in Afghanistan and eventually in the world (I know this sounds unbelievable to a lot of leftists, but I urge you to go to Lahore, spend a few days at Jamia Qadsia and talk to those people and LISTEN to them as if they have "agency" and are not just tools of some other imperialist conspiracy...i guarantee an enlightening experience). They are serious and they are not dumb. They are also capable of thinking strategically and taking the long view, but that long view is not some traditional vision of statecraft with Pakistan as its beneficiary, its a radically different vision of the world and its not all a figment of right wing American imagination. In my view, its not just the case that the jihadis were an instrument of the army. In many ways, the army was also an instrument of the jihadis. Hardcore believers WITHIN the army were able to get their more "moderate" fellow officers to go along (primarily by using words like "indian strategic threat" and "strategic depth" in front of semi-literate military officers who had been to national defence college and were therefore primed to believe nonsense anyway) in a vastly ambitious scheme that included training half a million terrorists and setting up intricate networks of terrorist organizations, all in plain view and with the army using its agencies and resources to support and protect them. Why would the army do that? the conventional answer is "to counter India". But this answer ignores the fact that the scheme mutated into an enterprise whose SUCCESS would have been even more fatal to Pakistan than any Indian threat. What other army in the world has sponsored such a vast transnational terrorist network based WITHIN their own country and with clearly stated ambitions that may be fatal to the existing state? Why would any rational army do this? I know that armies and states have used terrorists for various purposes and sometimes lost control of them, but notice the SCALE of this enterprise in Pakistan and think about it before you answer. I submit that NO rational army would ever do that, and in doing so, the Pakistani army was acting irrationally and this irrational act was pushed by a small core of jihadi officers who relied on the moronic inattention and incompetence of their fellow officers for success. Anyway, this scheme is not dead yet and if the army acts against them, they will be in the midst of a terrible fight because the jihadis are committed and well trained and organized. IF the army does not act against them and manages to hold off American pressure (by acting against some smaller components or putting on a show) then too the outlook is not rosy (for Pakistan, not even talking about India or anyone else). There will inevitably be new terrorist attacks outside Pakistan that will bring new pressure and will force the army to act against yet another component of the network until eventually the army will be in a war against all of them. In every case, a nasty war will be fought. There is a view that if the US and NATO withdraw, then the reason for the war is over. I believe that is not going to be an option. The jihadi network is real, they have ambitions, and those ambitions are not compatible with peaceful coexistence with India, Afghanistan or the rest of the world. When push comes to shove, the army will always pick "the world" over the jihadis because thats where their bread is buttered, but at that point, there will be a fight. We can argue about what constitutes a smart fight and what is not smart, but "political solution" is not an alternative to the fight. Naturally, a political solution has to be part of the package. But its not an alternative to the fighting, its part of the war.
Re: "I think that there is no political solution that does not involve SOME necessarily ...military action..." I completely agree; and I've so said in the past on CM as well (i.e. that we cannot ignore the ideological component of -- for want of a better word -- "jihadism"); it's just that "this" -- what is happening in terms of military action right now -- seems to me like a distinct thing. By confounding the two one risks imparting legitimacy to what even the pro-military action types concede is a bunch of rather cynical maneuvers by the Pakistani military (or, at a minimum, I need to be convinced that that isn't what is going on).
There IS such a thing as a core jihadi network who are determined to impose their vision in Pakistan, in India, in Afghanistan and eventually in the world (I know this sounds unbelievable to a lot of leftists To be fair though, I think most Leftists will acknowledge the empirical reality of the jihadi network but they would see its origin and growth due to other factors. I don't think anyone would deny the need for some military action, and no state can abandon the use of force as part of its approach; but as you say it cannot form the sole basis action and there is a need for a political solution as well. It is the appropriate policy-mix of political and military elements that would make for a stable long-term solution here; but has this mix even been attempted seriously? The initial examination seems to be that the state oscillates wildly from one extreme (ie seeking an extremely non-confrontational approach by trying to make deals with various militants and ceding their demands to outright represssion) without much effect. I submit that NO rational army would ever do that, and in doing so, the Pakistani army was acting irrationally and this irrational act was pushed by a small core of jihadi officers who relied on the moronic inattention and incompetence of their fellow officers for success. I wouldn't dispute the existence of such a core of Pakistani officers but are you sure that they devised the policy and carried it out for the last few decades? the policy of the Pakistani military has been quite consistent despite the changing nature of the officer corps and the formal govt and the doctrine of 'strategic depth' and building informal militant networks is as old. I remember a good article in Dawn several years back by Ayesha Jalal where she outlines the current security dilemma for Pakistan that makes it impossible to pursue its external security goals (attempted containment of Indian influence through militancy in Kashmir and a friendly govt in Afghanistan supported by a domestic infrastructure to generate cross-border militancy) and its internal security aims (maintaining domestic political and social stability) the problem was as Jalal pointed out, the Army was attempting to pursue both simultaneously when one undermined the other and that a choice would have to be made as to which one would receive priority. I also wouldn't put too much of emphasis on the 'rationality' of the military, if the military of several countries had their way, we would have already had a nuclear war. You only need to look at the US here, where large sections of the military beleived for a long time that they were deprived of a victory in Vietnam (despite dropping absurd amounts of ordnance on that country and killing millions) and where they think they can win the current COIN war in Afghanistan by just doing more of the same. Military rationality is very bounded in most cases and as an institution it can be highly limited in its approach to policy particularly over the broader strategic issues in a conflict situation.
" In my view, its not just the case that the jihadis were an instrument of the army. In many ways, the army was also an instrument of the jihadis. Hardcore believers WITHIN the army were able to get their more “moderate” fellow officers to go along (primarily by using words like “indian strategic threat” and “strategic depth” in front of semi-literate military officers who had been to national defence college and were therefore primed to believe nonsense anyway) in a vastly ambitious scheme that included training half a million terrorists and setting up intricate networks of terrorist organizations, all in plain view and with the army using its agencies and resources to support and protect them. I submit that NO rational army would ever do that, and in doing so, the Pakistani army was acting irrationally and this irrational act was pushed by a small core of jihadi officers who relied on the moronic inattention and incompetence of their fellow officers for success. " Very well put. The problem is an extremist virulent minority who have been trying for decades to push their own agenda, including by manipulating the Pakistani state and security establishment (and the security establishments of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, Jordan and other countries.) I am not sure how valuable Iraq is as a case study for Pakistan. The post 2003 Iraqi State and Iraqi security forces (ISF) didn't create the extremists, and were strongly committed to fighting the extremists from the start. Their challenge was "capability." A major effort to train and equip the ISF wasn't begun until 2006. Once it began, the situation in Iraq improved rapidly. Once local citizens and groups felt that the Iraqi Government and ISF were likely to win; they negotiated the best deal they could with the Iraqi Government and offered their support. It was this that caused violence in Iraq to drop between 95% and 90%. The primary contribution of the US military was: 1) increasing Iraqi capacity 2) short term combined operations with the ISF to improve short term security for the Iraqi public (in Iraq the resistance was a combination of Takfiri extremists, former supporters of Saddam Hussein, and Sunni Arab militias who feared that the Iraqi Government and Iran wanted to suppress them) 3) Negotiating agreements between local Sunni Arab Iraqi groups and their government, as well as reassuring Sunni Arab militias that the Iraqi Government (which they believed was an Iranian puppet) was open to a good relationship with them. Also important was what the US military didn't do. PM Maliki ordered the ISF to dismantle all the Iranian backed Iraqi Shiite extremist militias (which had mostly been fighting the Iraqi resistance between 2003 and 2007) in 2008. When the ISF militarily smashed the Iranian backed Shiite extremist militias, Iraq's minorities realized that the Iraqi government was not an Iranian stooge . . . causing a large nationalist wave among Iraqis as well a surge in respect for PM Maliki among Sunni Arab, Christian and Kurdish Iraqis. In Pakistan, the extremists have been created by parts of the Pakistani establishment which had been infiltrated and manipulated by the extremists. There is more uncertainty in Pakistan about the determination of the Pakistani security services to defeat the extremists (which wasn't a problem for the Iraqi Security Forces.) One possible parallel is if some of you see the Pakistani civil war as primarily between Punjabi/Sindhi/Kashmiri/Mohajir Pakistanis and Pashtun Pakistanis. Then the examples of the Iraqi government fighting its Sunni Arab minority might be applicable. However, I don't see the Pakistani civil war as ethnic. I wonder, do Pakistanis see their government as a Jewish, American, Indian, Iranian, Russian stooge? This, if true, would be another parallel with Iraq, where many Sunni Arabs use to see the Iraqi government as an Iranian American puppet. "You only need to look at the US here, where large sections of the military beleived for a long time that they were deprived of a victory in Vietnam (despite dropping absurd amounts of ordnance on that country and killing millions)" Actually the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) won the Vietnam war in 1972, when they defeated the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) without the aid of US ground troops. Only when the US government broke its treaty obligations to South Vietnam by refusing to give them money, was the ARVN was defeated in 1975. The ARVN fought until it ran out of fuel, ammunition and spare parts. Many ARVN fought even though they didn't get their salaries. You could argue that part of the problem was that the ARVN fought using US doctrine, which is very expensive per soldier (in equipment, ammunition, spares and fuel.) This was fine as long as America partly subsidized the ARVN (in the 1960s through 1972.) But the South Vietnamese economy was far too small to sustain the ARVN fighting using US doctrine once the US cut off aid to South Vietnam. The Pakistani Army to its credit fights far more inexpensively than the South Vietnamese Army did, or the Iraqi Army and Afghan National Army fights today (in terms of cost per soldier conducting combat operations.) This is however at the heavy cost of greater Pakistani Army casualties in combat versus what they would sustain if they had bullet proof equipment and proper armored vehicles.
“You only need to look at the US here, where large sections of the military beleived for a long time that they were deprived of a victory in Vietnam (despite dropping absurd amounts of ordnance on that country and killing millions)” Actually the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) won the Vietnam war in 1972, when they defeated the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) without the aid of US ground troops. Only when the US government broke its treaty obligations to South Vietnam by refusing to give them money, was the ARVN was defeated in 1975. The ARVN fought until it ran out of fuel, ammunition and spare parts. Many ARVN fought even though they didn't get their salaries. My point referred to the US winning the war when it was an active combat particpant and when this period came to an end in 1972 it was nowhere near as close to winning as it was in 1965. I didn't really say anything about the ARVN or the subsequent period but since you raise it: I don't know where you got the idea that the ARVN 'won' in 1972; they had already suffered an embarassing fiasco in the invasion of Laos the year before when half the total forces were either killed or captured. It is true that they managed to weather and beat back the Easter offensive in 1972 but this was only possible with massive American air-support and the commencement of Linebacker I by Nixon which resumed mass-scale bombing of the North. Despite this, the NVA still managed to hold on to the territory it overran, which the ARVN was not able to regain and improved its bargaining position in the Paris Peace talks. I think this was a very limited gain, which wouldn't have been possible without massive American aid. Only when the US government broke its treaty obligations to South Vietnam by refusing to give them money, was the ARVN was defeated in 1975. The ARVN fought until it ran out of fuel, ammunition and spare parts. Many ARVN fought even though they didn't get their salaries. This is a bit misleading, yes, the regime in the South could have survived longer with more US aid, but to say that it was anywhere nearer winning the war than the previous decades is wrong imo. Even by the time of the final offensive, the ARVN still had superiority in terms of aircraft, tanks and weaponry compared to the forces facing them. Their operational performance, while not abysmal, was far below what was needed to achieve anything near victory. The Najibullah regime in Kabul also managed to last for a couple of years after the Soviet Withdrawal in 1989, only collapsing after all Soviet aid was cut off in 1991 as a result of the failure of the anti-Gorbachov coup in Moscow. Unpopular and weak regimes can last for a fairly long time with massive external support; it doesn't mean that they can do anything much more than that. I am sure the Karzai regime will last as long as there are NATO troops in the country and for some time after they are withdrawn as long as it receives substantial external aid. But survive is all it will do, it won't come anywhere near defeating its enemy.
Conrad Barwa, I would advise you to speak to some South Vietnamese who left South Vietnam in the 1970s. There might be more than 10 million of them, including millions of Vietnamese Americans. Many of them are ARVN veterans. If you have a military background, I could inform you about the ARVN OOB. The ARVN had: -1 elite Marine Division which was one of the best special force units in the world -1 elite Airborne Division, which was also one of the best special force units in the world (Schwarzkopf, who had the good fortune of being an advisor to them in the mid 1960s writes in awe of them in his book) - 18 Ranger brigades (4.5 divisions worth.) I have never heard negative things said about them. Every GI who fought alongside them said good things about them. I suspect that the 313,000 South Korean soldiers who fought in South Vietnam would tell you similar things about them. How many countries have ever fielded a force as capable as the Rangers? -The Rangers fought with distinction alongside the US Marines in the battle of Khe San in 1967/1968 against the NVA. Khe San--an outpost along the South Vietnamese/North Vietnamese border--was arguably the biggest battle fought anywhere in the world since WWII. The NVA fielded long range artillery and weapon systems far superior to the US Marines and Rangers they fought against. They also greatly outnumbered the US Marines and Rangers. The NVA also fought extremely well (probably better than the Chinese ever fought in the 1950-1953 Korean war.) The NVA were forced to retreat back to North Vietnam. -The ARVN had 4 Corps, each with 5 or 6 divisions. These divisions had many conscripts. Some of these divisions were horrible. But four of these divisions were good quality. -Total ARVN had about 10 high quality divisions. How many countries have ever fielded 10 high quality divisions? The Italians haven't. Not even in WWI and WWII. The Israelis fielded 9 divisions in the Yon Kippur war of 1973. "Even by the time of the final offensive, the ARVN still had superiority in terms of aircraft, tanks and weaponry compared to the forces facing them." This is incorrect. What defeated the ARVN was when a column of 800 NVA tanks punched through the Southern lines. The North Vietnamese Air force was able to protect them from from the South Vietnamese Air Force (which was unable to operate because of a massive shortage of fuel, spare parts, and ammunition.) An F4 is useless without fuel and without rockets. Still the Rangers stopped the northern advance. The Rangers could have held them indefinitely if only they didn't run out of fuel, ammunition and spares. Also remember that the Soviets had more troops in North Vietnam in 1965 than the US had in South Vietnam. The Chinese maintained a steady strength force of 130,000 troops in North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese Air Force was flown by Chinese and Soviet pilots, and run by Chinese and Soviet generals; which is one reason it performed so well against the US air force and South Vietnamese air force. The North Vietnamese were almost completely funded and dependent on the Soviets and Chinese. How effective would the NVA have been without Soviet and Chinese advisers and trainers? [ARVN] "suffered an embarassing fiasco in the invasion of Laos the year before when half the total forces were either killed or captured." The NVA also suffered great losses, making it on the margin a slight win for the South. However the Laos operation was under resourced. Another problem is that the US military, ARVN generals, and President Thieu all were fighting different campaigns. President Thieu--who bless his heart wasn't a good general--kept messing with his ARVN generals and prevented them from decisively winning. Thieu was afraid to take too many casualties and losing too much equipment, (in part because Thieu like many of his fellow South Vietnamese feared that America was planning to betray him and was secretly in bed with the communists), fearing his ARVN would be needed to defend the homeland. Thieu denied the offensive sufficient ARVN assets. "It is true that they managed to weather and beat back the Easter offensive in 1972 but this was only possible with massive American air-support and the commencement of Linebacker I by Nixon which resumed mass-scale bombing of the North." This was partly true, although Thieu and many South Vietnamese didn't believe it. Thieu use to drive Kissinger and other Americans mad with his very long repetitive monologues about how the great ARVN was smashing the NVA with little American help, and how the ARVN was the greatest army ever and . . . on . . . and . . . . on . . . . and . . . you get the picture. Many other smart South Vietnamese spoke in much the same way. "Despite this, the NVA still managed to hold on to the territory it overran, which the ARVN was not able to regain and improved its bargaining position in the Paris Peace talks." Actually this is incorrect. The ARVN recaptured much of the territory that the NVA had captured. Thieu wanted to launch additional ARVN offensives against the NVA, including probably into North Vietnam. However, Nixon threatened Thieu is very inappropriate language. Nixon threatened to cut off all foreign aid to South Vietnam, all US air support, to strike a separate deal with North Vietnam against South Vietnam, and other ugly threats if the South didn't allow the North to occupy large parts of South Vietnam and to make other concessions to the North (including ending the Southern offensive against the north.) Thieu after months of angry retorts finally agreed provided the US promise in writing to: -continue foreign aid to South Vietnam -increase foreign aid to South Vietnam if the North invaded the South again. The US government lied and broke its promises to the South. US aid to the South was dramatically reduced from 1972 levels. "I think this was a very limited gain, which wouldn't have been possible without massive American aid." Without the US government paying almost all the ARVN's bills, the ARVN couldn't have won. I don't think the ARVN and South Vietnamese appreciated how dependent the ARVN was on foreign funding. "I am sure the Karzai regime will last as long as there are NATO troops in the country and for some time after they are withdrawn as long as it receives substantial external aid. But survive is all it will do, it won't come anywhere near defeating its enemy." If the ANSF gets $6 billion/year in funding over the long run (enough to build the ANAAC), and is allowed to fight inside Pakistan, I think they can defeat the Taliban. The problem for the ANSF was that it was massively underfunded until President Obama became president, and only allowed to hire a small fraction of the Afghans who wanted to join it. Nor were the ANSF allowed to accept Russian, Iranian and Indian assistance (which was publicly offered) to avoid offending Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The ANA is highly motivated to defeat the Taliban in spite of their small numbers. The Pakistani Army has the capability to defeat the Taliban, but lacks the will that the ANA has. Your comment reminds me of a conversation between the South Vietnamese and Israelis. The South Vietnamese, who greatly admired the Israelis, asked Israel how they won in 1948, 1956, and 1967 even though they were so badly outnumbered and outgunned. The Israeli PM Ben Gurion responded with characteristic Israeli bluntness, "we were fighting Arabs." {Implying that the NVA was far superior to any Arab army that had ever been fielded. Politically incorrect though it is to say it, Israel's PM was almost certainly right, as I am sure you would concede.} BTW, the North Vietnamese really liked the Israelis too. Ben Gurion was close friends with Ho Chi Minh. Not sure why Israelis and Vietnamese like each other so much. Maybe they are alike?
The US military and ARVN jointly defeated the Vietcong and NVA in 1968. The Vietcong ceased to be combat operational in 1969 (aside from NVA units flagged as "Vietcong" units.) However President Johnson and President Nixon blocked South Vietnamese requests to bomb North Vietnam (there was a four year ban on bombing the North; the US also forced the South Vietnamese Air force to abide by the ban), and to allow the ARVN to invade the North. Presidents Johnson and Nixon knew that the border was defended by the Chinese Army, and probably the Soviets too, and feared starting a nuclear war with China and the Soviets. {Johnson and Nixon felt that there were parallels between allowing an ARVN invasion of the North and the South Korean army being allowed to invade North Korea in 1950.} This was also a major reason that Johnson and Nixon banned bombing the North. Johnson, despite trying to avoid bombing the Soviet and Chinese Armies, had killed many of them, and desperately wanted to avoid WWIII. Both Presidents also knew that the North Vietnamese Air Force was in large part the repainted and re-flagged Soviet and Chinese Air Forces, and wanted to avoid directly engaging them by bombing North Vietnam. Nixon only allowed the bombing of North Vietnam in 1972 after the Chinese de facto acquiesced. {The Chinese both supported the North and had an ancient rivaly with the Vietnamese. They hoped that Nixon would help them cut the North Vietnamese down to size; even while the Chinese pretended to be North Vietnamese friends.} Since I discussed Khe Sanh above, I thought it might be worth mentioning that the NVA in the battle of Khe Sanh had artillery and weapons far superior to any the Chinese Army had or that the US military fielded in South Vietnam at the time. The Chinese Army had to watch inside North Vietnam as the Soviets armed and trained the NVA with their latest gear; which they didn't let the NVA share with the Chinese. Seeing the battle of Khe Sanh--a few miles from the North Vietnamese border which the Chinese Army helped defend--must have been galling to the Chinese Army. They must have been fuming at the Soviets.
1) Actually I do have a military background so feel free to use whatever details you wish. Frankly, I don't share your high opinion of the ARVN, no doubt some of their soldiers were well equipped and trained but their operational performance over the course of the war was not satisfactory, American evaluations of the war were reaching this conclusion well before 1972. Also you need to look at the ARVN as a whole, no army ever wins wars just based on its special forces, so imo it is kind of pointless to bring that up. Joint American and ARVN performance of special forces in COIN operations were a disaster and failed in their objectives. The officer corps of the ARVN was very poor, riddled with corruption, nepotism and ineffectiveness in combat. 2) I don't know of these numerous accounts of ARVN veterans you speak of; many American accounts were quite critical of their performance as they were of US forces, understandably given that many were either reluctant volunteers or conscripts who didn't want to be there. No standard history of the was even from the American side from John Paul Vann downwards would say otherwise. I don't see where you get the claim that the ARVN fielded '10 high quality divisions' from? What is the yardstick to be used here? High quality compared to what? What sources are these based from? ARVN veterans and retired American generals' private memoirs? Are these the best sources? 3) The claim that Khe Sanh was the biggest battle battle since WWII is just patently ridiculous. It might have been the longest, but in terms of scale is dwarfed by many others, I doubt if it was even the biggest during the Vietnam wars. Apart from anything else the mass-land battles during the Iran-Iraq war dwarf it, in terms of the personnel involved and deaths caused. And of course the NVA outnumbered the US and ARVN troops physically present in Khe Sanh, to surround and besiege an well entrenched enemy you need to have superiority in numbers. The ratio did not much exceed 3:1 which is what most commanders would be comfortable with as a minimum to have a chance of success in such an operation. In anycase, as both sides could replace losses (and did) with reserves during the course of the siege numbers remained relatively constant. In the end, the eventual abandonment of the outpost, just drove home the shifting nature of the conflict and how ill-adapted American tactics and strategy were to winning it. 4) As for the gap in superiority in terms of weapons: the ARVN has twice the number of tanks, three times the number of artillery and a 2:1 numerical superiority in terms of combat troops compared to the north. OF course, the South suffered due to the oil embargo that it after the Yom Kippur war but so did the North and the North's supply lines were much more extended and came under constant attack from the air. 5) I completely disagree with you about the North Vietnamese airforce; it was primarily defensive and I don't think it played the decisive role you claim during the Ho Chi Minh campaign. OF course there were Soviet and Chinese trainers present to impart the skills for the MiG fleets that the eastern bloc had given to the North but the claim that scores of Soviet and Chinese pilots flew combat missions is not verified by anything I have read and sounds a bit far-fetched to me. Any Third World nation would have needed to have such support to have a credible airforce starting at that level of the North. I also am unaware of the claim that there were more Soviet troops in the North than military 'advisors' of the US in the South in 1965 (could be true but I haven't seen reasonable evidence to indicate it). 6) I really don't know where you get the idea that the Laos operation was 'on the margin a slight success for the South' I have yet to read this claim anywhere outside the ARVN propaganda of the time. Even the Saigon regime and the US had a hard time acknowledging that it was anything but a failure. When your invasion force retreats with 50% losses, clinging to the skids of helicopters as they are evacuated, it isn't a victory of any sort. At all. I feel we must at least attempt to be realistic rather than getting carried away here. 7) My impression was that four provinces (Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, and Quang Tin) were under de facto NVA control but I could have got that wrong (I draw upon Fulgham and Maitland's volume on South Vietnam for the details). I think your claims about the viability of the Southern regime is just wrong; much of the rural areas had become completely wrecked and the Saigon regime delegitmised in the eyes of much of the population; despite the fighting many villages had either withdrawn their active support or gone over to the Communists (as illustrated by anthropologists at the time like Samuel Popkin). Backing an unpopular, delegitimized regime against an enemy which is able to successfully mobilise large sections of the population under the rubric of a national liberation movement is in the long-term a losing proposition. This is a political failure, to keep on insisting that only if we spent more money or bombed more things would have been different is self-defeating. The US military's own evaluations had reached this conclusion by the early 1970s despite its unpopularity with some members of the professional officer corps. 8) Ok, I just think you are completely wrong about the ANSF. Billions of dollars have already been spent and misused. It also isn't true that many people have been prevented from joining the ANSF — that is just false. Recruitment procedures have been very lax, so much so that drug addicts and those with a dubious record of loyalty to the regime have been recruited. Given the high casualty rates for the ANSF, this is not surprising, especially for the police who have borne the brunt of the attacks from the Taliban. I agree that the ANA and the ANP are poorly paid and their salaries would need to be increased to match what they could earn if they worked for the insurgents or the druglords but much more would need to be done. Already the same problems about the officer corps are cropping up, with a high rate of desertion and corruption. There is also the problem of ethnic balancing; since the leadership is dominated by northern non-Pashtun groups — sending such an army to fight in the south would be seen as sending an anti-Pashtun force to mount an occupation and would backfire. Accepting Russian help or Iranian help wouldn't go down well either given how suspiciously these powers are regarded by many and as for India, well the less said the better (not that I am sure what help India can extend here exactly). The problem with all these arguements of yours is that, they are the kind of things that NA leaders are saying to win support but they don't bear much reality to the facts on the ground or in terms of popular support. 9) As for the claim that the ANSF could 'win the war' if they could be allowed to operate in the NWFP, I am just going to disregard that sentence, given just how unrealistic it is. Such a thing will never be allowed to happen and if it did would spark a major conflagration as Pakistan would never tolerate it. 10) The Israeli —Vietnamese comparison: well Israeli success in the earlier wars was hardly unexpected; most military assessments especially in 1967 predicted an Israeli victory; they just didn't predict its speed or scale. I have heard the “we are fighting Arabs” quote several times from Israeli colleagues; however, I also studied under Israeli scholars like Avi Shlaim and Avner Offer so also know the less propagandistic story that Arab war aims were unclear, Arab armies uncoordinated and at least in the case of Jordan that there was a clear case of collusion with the Israelis and an unwillingness to fight. In any case that was a conventional war fought under specific conditions; when the IDF came up against an irregular forces that engaged in a guerrilla war as Hezbollah did in southern Lebanon, it was forced to withdraw and as the 2006 war showed, its conventional superiority came to nought as it still was unable to destroy Hezbollah. Since we are talking about insurgency, looking at conventional warfare is not the right comparison. In this the Israelis have been spectacularly ineffective in even dealing with the PLO and resistance in the Occupied Territories despite ongoing attempts and repressive measures over the last few decades. That would have been a better lesson for the Vietnamese to draw — not that it would have helped them. 10) I think you have drawn completely the wrong lessons from Vietnam but which ironically, even American commanders like McChrystal and Petraeus acknowledge — that in COIN warfare ultimate success will result when you can achieve a political victory as well as a military one and that winning over the consent of enough of the local population towards you and away from the insurgents is what counts. As the American general said to his Vietnamese counterpart “You never defeated us on the battlefield” and got the reply “That might be true, it is also irrelevant”.
(10) South Vietnam was primarily a conventional war rather than a COIN war; this was especially true after 1969. The reason the ARVN had so many challenges was because it was prevented by America from launching offensives against the NVA in Cambodia, Laos and North Vietnam. America desperately wanted to avoid clashes with the Chinese and Soviet militaries, which were based in North Vietnam. I agree that incompetent Arab armies contributed greatly to Israeli victories. "Arab war aims were unclear, Arab armies uncoordinated and at least in the case of Jordan that there was a clear case of collusion with the Israelis and an unwillingness to fight." True, as Arabs have explained to me. The IDF performed better against Hezbollah in 2006 than you imply. Remember that the flower of Hezbollah's army died, including perhaps 300 of their officers and NCOs, and another 300 less experienced fighters. What is true is that Hezbollah inflicted heavy losses on the IDF as well. Don't understand your comparison with South Vietnam. South Vietnam had a mostly free election in 1967 with very high voter turnout. The largest threat South Vietnam faced was a conventional enemy. (9) "I am just going to disregard that sentence, given just how unrealistic it is. Such a thing will never be allowed to happen and if it did would spark a major conflagration as Pakistan would never tolerate it." Why? The ANA is 40% Pashtu, and highly motivated and loyal to its chain of command. Ideally the Pakistani Army does it. If the Pakistani Army won't do it; then what alternative is there? No country can accept frequent attacks from across the border without a response. Both the large Nuristan attacks involved Pakistanis, as have many attacks in the Khost bowl (many of Haqqani's fighters are Pakistanis, including Lashkar e Taiba, Jaish e Mohammed, Lashkar e Jhanvi/Sipah e Sahaba/Jundullah; who fight under Haqqani's banner.) The only army in the world with many committed Pashtuns other than the Pakistani Army is the ANA. One of them will have to solve this shared problem. (8) "It also isn't true that many people have been prevented from joining the ANSF — that is just false" The fact is that the ANA in particular only accepts a fraction of applicants. This is a long standing problem. I have quite a bit of info about this. But don't believe me. Directly call the Afghan MoD (they might not respond to your e-mail), or e-mail CSTC-A/NTM-A and ask them this question. "those with a dubious record of loyalty to the regime have been recruited. " Prove this. I am referring only to the ANA. The ANA is pretty good at ferreting out the bad apples. I haven't yet read about an ANA adviser who didn't feel safe with them. I don't doubt that the Taliban tries to infiltrate many people into boot camp. But fellow ANA do a decent job removing them. This said, it is probable that there are some ANA who are passing information to the Taliban or organized crime (organized crime being the greater problem.) If ANA Taliban informants were found out by their fellow ANA, I think we both know what would happen to them. "Already the same problems about the officer corps are cropping up, with a high rate of desertion and corruption." I have heard good things about junior ANA officers. Have you ever heard anything negative about ANA lieutenants? Serious question. I haven't. The problems relate to the older mid grade and senior officers who served in the old communist army, anti Soviet Mujaheddin, or former Northern Alliance. If most of them could be bribed with early retirement, the ANA would improve overnight. The latest figures on the ANA AWOL rate were released earlier this month. They are running at 5% over the last year; but are much higher for 205th ANA Corps fighting in the South. Excluding 205th ANA Corps, they are so low that I have difficulty believing they could be true. Do they achieve these numbers by firing any problematic soldier? Especially surprising in 203rd ANA (Khost Bowl) which has the lowest AWOL rate of any Corps despite a heavy tempo of operations against Haqqani and his Punjabi Taliban allies. The 203rd ANA is the best quality out of 5 ANA Corps. You have a point about corruption, although this relates to the senior and mid grade officers we discussed above. "There is also the problem of ethnic balancing; since the leadership is dominated by northern non-Pashtun groups — sending such an army to fight in the south would be seen as sending an anti-Pashtun force to mount an occupation and would backfire." The ANA is 40% Pashtu overall. Look up the names of the senior officers of 203rd ANA (Khost/Paktya/Paktika/Ghazni), and 205th ANA (Southern provinces.) Many of them are Pashtun. Where did you hear this allegation about ethnic balancing? Why do you think Southern Pashtu oppose the ANA? I have heard the opposite is true in Kandahar and Helmand where the ANA is popular among the locals. I use to think that the ANA's problem was related to the type of Pashtu in the ANA (many from Khost and other pro GIRoA Eastern Afghan Pashtu); and while this might still be true; the 205th ANA 1st and 3rd brigades at least have Southern Pashtu. I would like to research, however, how the ANA breaks down by Pashtun tribe or subregion (versus East Pashtu/Southern Pashtu, by which metric the ANA is balanced.) Every public opinion poll taken in Afghanistan since 2001 has shown that the ANA is by far the most popular Afghan institution, including among Afghan Pashtuns. Why do you think the ANA isn't popular among Southern Pashtun? "Accepting Russian help or Iranian help wouldn't go down well either given how suspiciously these powers are regarded by many" Russia has publicly offered to assist with ANSF training many times, including during Obama's visit to Russia. My understanding is that the primary obstacle to accepting Russian help comes from the ANSF leaders. However, they are reluctant to openly articulate it. They are also dependent on Russian donated equipment, and might require Russian trainers in the future. I think that ISAF is more receptive to Russian help than the Afghans. However Russian help might make Pakistan and Saudi Arabia flip. Iran has offered to train the ANSF in the past, and Afghans might be open to it. My hope is that Obama reaches some kind of grand bargain with Iran that allows the Iranians to contribute to CSTC-A/NTM-A. In the case of Iran, the Bush administration did not respond to formal Iranian offers to train and equip the ANSF on a large scale in 2001 and 2002; or Iranian hints after that. I think that this was a significant mistake. (not that I am sure what help India can extend here exactly) I think that India could help substantially with ANSF officer and NCO academies, as well as with increasing the number of ANA in boot camp at any given time. Why do you think India can't help? Turkey, for example has contributed greatly to the ANA, both in trainers and in OMLTs. {Less sure about the ANP, but I suspect the Turks might also have POMLTs for the ANP.} The Turks helped found the ANA 4 year academy when Rumsfeld and Cheney wanted to limit US involvement in ANSF training (translation: convince countries other than the US to do it, with as small a role for the US as possible.) (5) There are several accounts of the North Vietnamese Air Force and air defense forces and how it they were run by the Soviets and Chinese. Why was the kill to kill ratio for the US air force and South Vietnamese Air Force so poor during the Vietnam war? Why were so many US aircraft shot down? Who ran the South Vietnamese Air defense forces? (7) Do you have any evidence that the South Vietnamese government was less popular than the North Vietnamese Politburo? I don't question that many South Vietnamese were frustrated by their government. Most of them just happened to dislike the North Vietnamese Politburo more. 200,000 NVA and Viet Cong flipped and joined the ARVN. By contrast, far fewer ARVN joined the NVA or Viet Cong. Have you read any books by South Vietnamese? You might consider reading a few. When was there a large scale popular movement against the South Vietnamese government that was pro North Vietnamese Politburo? Unlike the Northern dictatorship, the South did have mostly free election with high voter turnout in 1967. The problem was that Thieu, who won in 1967, didn't allow a fair election in 1971, to South Vietnam's great loss. Whenever you assess a military, you need to break it down by parts. Rate each unit individually. I identified 6.5 divisions above that were very good quality. I challenge you to find anyone who would dispute the quality of these specific units. Out of the 20-24 divisions in the rest of the ARVN, about 4 were good quality. Many of them had massive problems. However, 10 good quality divisions is still an amazing achievement for any country. They nearly defeated the NVA. They would have, if only they had gotten funding. Might respond to other South Vietnam comments later.
South Vietnam was primarily a conventional war rather than a COIN war; this was especially true after 1969. The reason the ARVN had so many challenges was because it was prevented by America from launching offensives against the NVA in Cambodia, Laos and North Vietnam. America desperately wanted to avoid clashes with the Chinese and Soviet militaries, which were based in North Vietnam. I think it combined elements of both, I wouldn't say it turned into a real conventional war until 1972; the Vietnam wars were the worst possible mix of all wars: a civil war, a guerrilla war and a rural based insurgency fought by proxies. Many of these characteristics remained in place till the end. The IDF performed better against Hezbollah in 2006 than you imply. Remember that the flower of Hezbollah's army died, including perhaps 300 of their officers and NCOs, and another 300 less experienced fighters. What is true is that Hezbollah inflicted heavy losses on the IDF as well. Ok, I think you missed my point here; Hezbollah's aim isn't and wasn't to win a conventional victory on the battlefield, they know they can't do this, their propaganda aside. Their aim was to show that they could withstand an Israeli attack and not give in to Israeli pressure which they did successfully. Israeli forces neither managed to destroy Hezbollah as the Israeli leadership boasted they would do nor were they able to secure the release of IDF personnel that were captured or pressure Hezbollah into doing so. This is why Hezbollah were turned into heroes in many parts of the Arab world; the Israelis handed them a massive propaganda victory by showing that an Arab force could withstand the full might of the IDF and force them to withdraw. Irregular forces and movements like Hezbollah don't win their wars by losing fewer men than the enemy; in fact they assume that their casualties will be heavier given the imbalance in firepower, they win by outlasting the enemy and making it too costly for them to continue in hostilities. But yes, Hezbollah losses were very heavy and I believe their leader Nasrullah retrospectively regarded the war as a mistake; but it doesn't change the outcome. I don't think you can measure success in terms of body counts in such wars, it was this kind of thinking that led to problems in Vietnam. Forces like Hezbollah will replace their losses relatively quickly and rebuild (which they actually have managed to do rather impressively after the Israeli withdrawal). Why? The ANA is 40% Pashtu, and highly motivated and loyal to its chain of command. Where did you get the idea that the ANA is highly motivated? Most accounts rate their reliability and effectiveness at 50% and this is under current conditions. If you look at the accounts of OMLT officers who have done training such as Doug Beattie or Tim Docherty the picture is a pretty grim one. The leadership is poor, drug abuse a serious problem not to mention abuse of the local civilian population. The Battles for Sangin in 2006 and 2007 exposed these problems quite severely, added to which were the refusal of the ANA to work with the ANP and rivalry between the two; leading to several fiascos on the battlefield such as the ANA refusing to mount joint attacks with the latter in offensive operations. The fact is that the ANA in particular only accepts a fraction of applicants. This is a long standing problem. I have quite a bit of info about this. But don't believe me. Directly call the Afghan MoD (they might not respond to your e-mail), or e-mail CSTC-A/NTM-A and ask them this question. I would have to see the data on this that you refer to; most field accounts that I have seen do not back up this assertion and there is a big discrepancy between what the Afghan MoD claims on paper and what actually takes place in practise. Prove this. I am referring only to the ANA. The ANA is pretty good at ferreting out the bad apples. I haven't yet read about an ANA adviser who didn't feel safe with them. I don't doubt that the Taliban tries to infiltrate many people into boot camp. But fellow ANA do a decent job removing them. This said, it is probable that there are some ANA who are passing information to the Taliban or organized crime (organized crime being the greater problem.) If ANA Taliban informants were found out by their fellow ANA, I think we both know what would happen to them. You can refer to Doug Beattie's account in “Task Force Helmand” Beattie was a Major with the Royal Irish who led an OMLT in Helmand province in 2006 and 2007. In his 2007 campaign he documents quite clearly the ineffectiveness of ANA forces, including a reluctance to engage in aggressive patrolling, engaging the local population, extra-judicial killing of prisoners, refusal to undertake combat operations during festival days and seasons (something not matched by the Taliban) amongst others. During several disputes he quite clearly states that several members of his OMLT had to be rotated out because of security concerns as they had made complaints over ANA killing of captured prisoners. Stephen Gray in “Operation Snakebite” covers several aspects of the ANA as well, including the desertion rates, enrolment inflation by officers and the extent of drug abuse. I agree though that the ANA is not as compromised as the ANP are in terms of being penetrated by the Taliban or Taliban sympathisers, something that came through very clearly in several accounts of arrests by ISAF soldiers of ANP personnel 'flagging' positions and passing other information over to the Taliban — you can find several documented examples in James Fergusson's “A Million Bullets” with regard to the battles at New Zad and Musa Qala. I have heard good things about junior ANA officers. Have you ever heard anything negative about ANA lieutenants? Serious question. I haven't. The problems relate to the older mid grade and senior officers who served in the old communist army, anti Soviet Mujaheddin, or former Northern Alliance. If most of them could be bribed with early retirement, the ANA would improve overnight. Refer to the sources above I cited, I actually stopped reading on this topic several months ago because it was just the same story being repeated over and over again. Of course it isn't as if to say there aren't good officers within the ANA or ANP just that they are not the representative cases. The latest figures on the ANA AWOL rate were released earlier this month. They are running at 5% over the last year; but are much higher for 205th ANA Corps fighting in the South. Excluding 205th ANA Corps, they are so low that I have difficulty believing they could be true. Do they achieve these numbers by firing any problematic soldier? Especially surprising in 203rd ANA (Khost Bowl) which has the lowest AWOL rate of any Corps despite a heavy tempo of operations against Haqqani and his Punjabi Taliban allies. The 203rd ANA is the best quality out of 5 ANA Corps. These statistics compiled by whom though and are they verified. Everything that has come out of Afghanistan has indicated that the line ministries in Kabul have a much rosier picture of what is happening than is true. The guesstimates from what I have read never cite AWOL rates lower than 10% - of many of these aren't 'permanent' desertions as they include soldiers that just go on leave without approval for various reasons and then return to their units several weeks later. This, however, still impacts on operational capability. The ANA is 40% Pashtu overall. Look up the names of the senior officers of 203rd ANA (Khost/Paktya/Paktika/Ghazni), and 205th ANA (Southern provinces.) Many of them are Pashtun. Where did you hear this allegation about ethnic balancing? The officer corps, particularly in the higher ranks are not 40% Pashtun — my source is Seth Green's book “The Graveyard of Empires” and I think he uses US sources not Afghan MoD ones for his arguement but I have to check that. I have heard the opposite is true in Kandahar and Helmand where the ANA is popular among the locals. Excuse me but WHAT? Most of my reading and sources are confined to Helmand (since this is the primary theatre of British operations) and this is the first time that I have heard that the ANA is 'popular amongst the locals' — popular relative to what? The ANP, probably since they don't abuse and extract as much money from the locals that the former do. But it would be a bit of a stretch to claim that the ANA is popular with local civilians. Just read the accounts of OMLT officers from the UK or Canada who actually work with them to get a taste of the nature civil-military relations in these provinces. I think you are mis-informed here. Every public opinion poll taken in Afghanistan since 2001 has shown that the ANA is by far the most popular Afghan institution, including among Afghan Pashtuns. Why do you think the ANA isn't popular among Southern Pashtun? To be honest, I would have to see the exact details of these opinion polls. I would be extremely sceptical of polling anyway in a scenario such as Afghanistan, where it will provide only a limited insight into popular opinion. I didn't actually say that the ANA was unpopular but unleashing a COIN war with them in their current state certainly will make them unpopular. I remain highly sceptical as to how popular they are exactly amongst the local population in the South, pretty much everything and I mean everything indicate that they are not as popular as you claim. There was a window of opportunity where this wasn't the case back in 2001 but this changed within a couple of years. Most ground accounts, indicate that the local population will back/support whoever can deliver security (ie not kill or abuse the local population) and I don't think the ANA are doing that well on this score. I think that India could help substantially with ANSF officer and NCO academies, as well as with increasing the number of ANA in boot camp at any given time. Why do you think India can't help? Outside the traditional NA forces I don't think many would be enthusiastic about receiving training from India. Especially given the Indian army's record in Kashmir, I feel this would lead to tensions. This is besides the fact that I don't it is feasible to start training large numbers of troops in Indian facilities anyway. The point is all this smacks of having foreign trained local troops to essentially participate in a civil war, imo this will backfire even if it is successfully implemented as it will delegitimize the ANA in the eyes of the population. There are several accounts of the North Vietnamese Air Force and air defense forces and how it they were run by the Soviets and Chinese. Why was the kill to kill ratio for the US air force and South Vietnamese Air Force so poor during the Vietnam war? Why were so many US aircraft shot down? I haven't seen of these accounts that are credible. My impression was that it was restrictive ROE and difficulties in using air-to-air missiles that accounted for poor kill ratios. In anycase Soviet and Chinese pilots are not so superior to US pilots that their use would account for such an imbalanced kill ratio on its own. Do you have any evidence that the South Vietnamese government was less popular than the North Vietnamese Politburo? Umm, wasn't it pretty much known by everyone that had elections been held in the mid-50s in the South that the Communists would have won? Which is the reason why Eisenhower cancelled the elections. When was there a large scale popular movement against the South Vietnamese government that was pro North Vietnamese Politburo? Well, there were several uprisings, the NLF would not have existed without popular support — popular discontent was seen by the tens of thousands who demonstrated against Diem — one of the reasons why the Americans supported offing him. Most academic accounts like Popkin's document how the Saigon govt had lost control over large parts of the countryside and its populations. Unrestricted bombing, use of free fire zones, the failure of the strategic hamlet programme, incompetence of the Southern government in terms of developmental expenditure, tax collection and accountability all contributed to this. This is not a new or original story, so I am surprised that it is being queried. Unlike the Northern dictatorship, the South did have mostly free election with high voter turnout in 1967. The problem was that Thieu, who won in 1967, didn't allow a fair election in 1971, to South Vietnam's great loss. Free? By whose accounting. There was significant coercion and severe limitations on who could run. Many who took an anti-war and anti-American stance were prevented from running. This is documented even by American sources such as Karnow's history and Sheehan's account of the war. Whenever you assess a military, you need to break it down by parts. Rate each unit individually. I identified 6.5 divisions above that were very good quality. I challenge you to find anyone who would dispute the quality of these specific units. Out of the 20-24 divisions in the rest of the ARVN, about 4 were good quality. Many of them had massive problems. However, 10 good quality divisions is still an amazing achievement for any country. Actually, like I said I don't know what yardsticks you are using for these measurements; no standard history of the war I have read makes these arguements. The best American evaluations of the conflict that I have read, like Creighton Abrams' policy papers ( you can read their basic content in Andrew Bacevich's book “The New American Militarism”) don't support these assertions. Also I just want to add that during the later stages of the war, the South was a highly militarised society engaged in a full scale war — any country that spends enough and mobilises enough soldiers and is committed to fighting a war of survival will be able to raise a reasonable number of good quality infantry divisions, I would expect the RoK and Taiwan to be able to do so were they engaged in similar wars. Comparing this to peacetime armies is an unwarranted and incorrect comparison as no country is going to maintain such a number of combat troops unless it is in a large scale conflict or gearing up for one. Peacetime conditions do no warrant such a build up. They nearly defeated the NVA. They would have, if only they had gotten funding. IMO this is pernicious thinking and just misunderstands the whole basis of the conflict. It assumes that if only more supplies were, more dollars spent, more body counts piled up the war would have been won. The war was not a linear one like this, the North recovered from massive conventional defeats like the Tet offensive within a few years to repeat the exercise and it kept on doing so and would have continued. It could because, it was able to mobilise enough support from its own population and within the South — which the South could never do because it did not have an effective political strategy. It was effectively at war with large sections of its own population and propped up by an external power — it could never turn on and fight the Americans the way the North Vietnamese did just a few years after the war ended in 1975 — because the North was able to mobilise its population in a way the South was not. IF Russian and Chinese forces had run around massacring North Vietnamese civilians and I don't think the Northern reaction would have been as craven as the Southern was. The Northern govt for all its repressiveness and dictatorial tendencies was a North Vietnamese govt; it wasn't imposed by the Soviets or the Chinese, its leaders could not be disposed of in coup d'etat's like the Southern leaders could be or be handpicked according to the fancy of foreign administrations. It was a govt for all its unattractive qualities, rooted in North Vietnamese society with a strong social base. The one lesson we can draw from the Vietnamese wars is that in an era of nationalism and nation-states; when a conflict is turned into one where there is a mass-based nationalism ranged against any other force, it will eventually tend to win.
Conrad Barwa, keep in mind that it was widely believed in the ARVN to a slightly lesser degree among South Vietnamese in general that America was secretly in bed with the communists. As it turned out, this was not far from the truth. America did stab the South Vietnamese in the back when they were down. Many of the American sources you cite are suspect because they were sympathetic to North Vietnam versus the South Vietnamese. This was even true of some American GIs that were "supposedly" trying to fight in support of the South Vietnamese against the North Vietnamese. The North Vietnamese were more popular among Americans than they were among South Vietnamese. The South Vietnamese didn't forget the NVA massacres at Hue and many other places in 1968. But for Americans . . . well the welfare of South Vietnamese wasn't exactly a priority for many Americans. Most of the books on this period have to be read with a grain of salt. I have read perhaps 20 of them. You might consider read books about the ARVN, books written by ARVN combat advisers. or books written by South Vietnamese. Do you really believe that military funding isn't a major driver of the outcome of a war? "the North recovered from massive conventional defeats like the Tet offensive within a few years to repeat the exercise and it kept on doing so and would have continued." This is because the North was almost completely dependent on Soviet and Chinese troops, advisors, trainers and money. The ARVN also recovered from its losses when the US bothered to provide them funding. The NVA had sanctuaries in Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam, while the South Vietnamese were not allowed to attack into North Vietnam to avoid contact with the Chinese and Soviet armies. As I mentioned, many of the NVA draftees didn't want to fight their southern brothers. Why else did 200,000 NVA and Vietcong defect and join the South Vietnamese security forces to fight the communists? Far fewer ARVN defected than NVA. Look this up for yourself. One reason so many South Vietnamese were so motivated to fight the NVA was the perception about Southerners that the North Vietnamese were Chinese puppets. I think neither the South Vietnamese nor the North Vietnamese governments were puppets, however, both sides launched these kinds of IO against the other. You might want to look at the 1967 election more closely. Pro North Vietnamese candidates didn't do well. The turnout was very high. Personally, I think the South Vietnamese chose badly in the election. This is what lead to the eventual collapse of their country. "It was effectively at war with large sections of its own population." Yes. However, the same would have been true for the NVA if the ARVN were allowed to invade the North. Both sides had substantial legitimacy and popularity among Vietnamese. If the ARVN wasn't proof that the south could mobilize its population, we live in parallel universes. ARVN had remarkably low AWOL rates given the circumstances. As I said, the ARVN concentrated its best soldiers in 6.5 elite divisions. This robbed the rest of the ARVN of good officers and NCOs. I still challenge you to come up with anything negative about these elite ARVN divisions. I think you believe the ARVN should have fought the US troops? Why? To my knowledge, it wasn't the US that was attacking the ARVN and the South Vietnamese government. The ARVN was far more focused on defending their people from NVA who were running around murdering South Vietnamese civilians. Your allegation about coups is strange. South Vietnam didn't have any coups between 1965 and 1975. You might want to read about the 1963-1965 coups from a South Vietnamese perspectives. Bhaiya, you have been brainwashed by North Vietnamese IO and the many Americans they manipulated with their PR. On US military assessments of the ARVN, you should keep a couple things in mind: -observe what ARVN units are being discussed and when the observations are made -read Schwarzkopf's account of the ARVN perspective on the US forces. It wasn't very flattering. Schwarzkopf, as an advisor for the Airborne brigade in the mid 1960s (it didn't expand to a division until later), shared the Airborne brigade's perspective on US forces. The US mission should have been more focused on training and advising the ARVN, and less on conducting their own operations. -naturally, some conventional US military didn't get COIN or FID, and had a negative view of the ARVN; much like the ARVN didn't think much of the combat effectiveness of many US military units For every US aircraft shot down in air to air combat, 3 North Vietnamese ones were. This was far worse than the US suffered against the Chinese and Soviet air forces 1950-1953. The North Vietnamese Air Force was Soviet and Chinese in all but name until 1968. Then there was the 4 year ban on air strikes on the North and on the South (imposed by the Soviets and Chinese for the same reason Johnson imposed a ban on bombing the North.) By 1972, the North had taken more control over their air force. It is sad that the USSR and Chinese bankrupted themselves supporting the North Vietnamese, causing great suffering on the part of their people. Might bring up some more info on the ARVN later. ANSF: In recent public opinion polls, India was most popular large country for Afghans, mostly a reflexive response to Pakistan I think. In the 2.09.09 public opinion poll, Pakistan was viewed unfavorably by 91% of Afghans, the Taliban by 91% of Afghans, Osama Bin Laden by 92% of Afghans. There is a widely held and I think false perception among Afghans that the Taliban are backed by Pakistan. The ANA seem eager for Indian trainers and advisers in much the way Afghans like the Turkish trainers and advisors. Iran isn't as popular, but the ANA would probably like their help. Russian trainers aren't popular, which is why Russian offer of large numbers of trainers haven't been accepted. Unfortunately, I think the ANA needs Russian help. Chinese help would be very valuable, especially since China is pro Pakistan. I don't know why Obama isn't asking China more to train the ANSF. "unleashing a COIN war with them in their current state certainly will make them unpopular. I remain highly sceptical as to how popular they are exactly amongst the local population in the South, pretty much everything and I mean everything indicate that they are not as popular as you claim. There was a window of opportunity where this wasn't the case back in 2001 but this changed within a couple of years. Most ground accounts, indicate that the local population will back/support whoever can deliver security (ie not kill or abuse the local population) and I don't think the ANA are doing that well on this score." Do you have any evidence for this? Why don't you directly ask ANA combat advisers for 205th ANA Corps? "Just read the accounts of OMLT officers from the UK or Canada who actually work with them to get a taste of the nature civil-military relations in these provinces. I think you are mis-informed here." I have. What is your source? Specifically ANA 1-205 (Kandahar) and 3-205 (Helmand.) I use to castigate 3-205 for losing the war in Helmand but an OMLT who had worked with them corrected me and argued that the 3-205 had a very high tempo of operations. I have heard good things about BG Ghori, commander of ANA 3-205. The problem is that 3-205 is too small for its battlespace, however. The ANP in Kandahar and Helmand have more problems. "Seth Green's book “The Graveyard of Empires”" is wrong about the ANA senior leadership for 205th ANA that fights in the South. A simple fact check would have told him as much. My suspicion is that while Pashtuns are well represented among senior ANA officers, specific groups of Pashtuns are not. However, I am not smart enough to figure out what Pashtun tribes someone is from based on their name. Perhaps you could research this. I don't know how to ask this question without seeming uncouth. Do you have any ideas for how to determine this? About half of all ANA units are rated CM-1. However, I question how good some CM-1 units really are. {In the 1980s, only about a tenth of all Soviet army divisions were rated ORA level 1.} Would be interested in reading about "accounts of OMLT officers who have done training such as Doug Beattie or Tim Docherty" "You can refer to Doug Beattie's account in “Task Force Helmand” Beattie was a Major with the Royal Irish who led an OMLT in Helmand province in 2006 and 2007. In his 2007 campaign he documents quite clearly the ineffectiveness of ANA forces" A few things to keep in mind. The ANA didn't start an officer academy until January 2005 (thank God the Turks took the lead when Rumsfeld and Cheney didn't want a large US role in training the ANSF.) The first 4 year graduates were commissioned in January, 2009. There have only been 84 graduates so far. The ANA trains 2nd Lieutenants through another program for all of 20 weeks per recruit. However this program only started up recently. As a result there were very few 2nd Lieutenants trained between 2001 and 2006. Doug Beattie would have been right to criticize the ANA in 2006. The ANA also use to have a 40% AWOL rate back then, in part because the pay was so bad and irregular that ANA soldiers needed second jobs to support their families. Remember that the ANA budget in 2006 was about $240 million. This is for a country of over 3 crore people (over 30 million) that is as large as Pakistan. The official AWOL rate has fallen from 40% to about 5% based on the latest data from early this month. I shared with you my skepticism about the 5% number. However, by any measure, ANA AWOL rates are amazingly low under the circumstances. "a reluctance to engage in aggressive patrolling, engaging the local population, extra-judicial killing of prisoners, refusal to undertake combat operations during festival days and seasons (something not matched by the Taliban) amongst others." All still true. Including extra-judicial killing. The ANA doesn't trust the ANP to prosecute the Taliban they capture. The ANA does like their festivals. Keep in mind that they see this as a decadal struggle; and fight accordingly. They live life while they fight. I don't agree on engaging the local population however. Most villagers like the ANA and they seem good at engaging with the locals. Hezbollah: I think the objective of both sides was to inflict heavy losses on the other. Both succeeded. I would argue that the IDF performed better in 2006 than it had ever fought before. The problem was that Hezbollah also fought very well. I don't agree with you that Hezbollah has fully recovered from 2006. It takes many years to replace good NCOs and officers.
Conrad Barwa, keep in mind that it was widely believed in the ARVN to a slightly lesser degree among South Vietnamese in general that America was secretly in bed with the communists. As it turned out, this was not far from the truth. America did stab the South Vietnamese in the back when they were down. This is a silly arguement — the war was a traumatic experience for the US, undermined key aspects of the post-war social consensus, played a key role in dismantling the Bretton Woods system and dollar hegemony, fatally weakened Johnson's Great Society programme, the last serious large scale fiscal assault on Poverty in the US and led to over 50,000 American deaths not to mention veterans physically and mentally affected and you think the Americans were somehow in cahoots with the Communists?!?! This is only one step above the 9-11 conspiracy theorists imo! Many of the American sources you cite are suspect because they were sympathetic to North Vietnam versus the South Vietnamese. This is rubbish, sorry; the sources I cited like Karnow and Sheehan have their faults but they are NOT sympathetic to the North Vietnamese; they are however critical of US policy and the South — which is the real objection to them, I think you have. They basically have a pro-American approach in their outlook and regard the war as a series of errors. Most of the books on this period have to be read with a grain of salt. I have read perhaps 20 of them. You might consider read books about the ARVN, books written by ARVN combat advisers. or books written by South Vietnamese. Should accounts by ARVN veterans who have their axes to grind not be read with sackful of salt as well? This is because the North was almost completely dependent on Soviet and Chinese troops, advisors, trainers and money. The ARVN also recovered from its losses when the US bothered to provide them funding. The NVA had sanctuaries in Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam, while the South Vietnamese were not allowed to attack into North Vietnam to avoid contact with the Chinese and Soviet armies. Oh come on, both sides were dependent on their Cold War patrons for funding; complaining that the North used them is just silly imo. I would argue that their dependence was not as much as you imply nor as extensive as to what the US supplied to the South. The North was better at mobilising its own resources which you omit to mention. As I mentioned, many of the NVA draftees didn't want to fight their southern brothers. Why else did 200,000 NVA and Vietcong defect and join the South Vietnamese security forces to fight the communists? Far fewer ARVN defected than NVA. Look this up for yourself. Just out of interest where do you get the 200,000 claim from? And the supposedly incredibly low AWOL rates for the ARVN? Please tell, this isn't ARVN sources! You might want to look at the 1967 election more closely. Pro North Vietnamese candidates didn't do well. The turnout was very high. Think you need to look carefully at the elections yourself; many independent candidates were incarcerated or prevented from running. However, the same would have been true for the NVA if the ARVN were allowed to invade the North. Both sides had substantial legitimacy and popularity among Vietnamese. No, all indications point towards the fact that the North was much more able to withstand external pressure because it was more cohesive and had greater institutional strength — reaction to the mass-scale bombing campaigns shows this. ARVN had remarkably low AWOL rates given the circumstances. As I said, the ARVN concentrated its best soldiers in 6.5 elite divisions. This robbed the rest of the ARVN of good officers and NCOs. I still challenge you to come up with anything negative about these elite ARVN divisions. Excuse me — but you made the claim that these were 'elite divisions and when I queried you about what sources you are using, what yardsticks and how they were being measured, you ignore me completely and instead want me to debunk a tall claim you are putting forward?! Surely it is incumbent on you to provide the evidence here, rather than rely on me to try and refute it? I think you believe the ARVN should have fought the US troops? Why? To my knowledge, it wasn't the US that was attacking the ARVN and the South Vietnamese government. The ARVN was far more focused on defending their people from NVA who were running around murdering South Vietnamese civilians. I didn't actually say the ARVN should have done that, just that the callous disregard (to speak euphemistically) that the US forces showed for civilian life in the South could hardly have endeared them to the local population. For a military to stand by and co-operate with such an occupying power would hardly have sent a positive message; you yourself have pointed out that “the welfare of South Vietnamese wasn't exactly a priority for many Americans.” A kind way of putting it, if ever I heard one!!! Also of course the VC and NVA killed many civilians, it was an ugly civil war where both sides engage in these killings — the ARVN was hardly above the fray as you claim and engaged in such killing as well. Bhaiya, you have been brainwashed by North Vietnamese IO and the many Americans they manipulated with their PR. Oh dear, I could as well say that you are just repeated tired old Cold War propaganda that isn't believed by anybody except by some disgruntled veterans and Rambo movie fans. I am in awe of this North Vietnamese propaganda, that managed to brainwash entire sections of the US military leadershoip, those carrying out post-conflict assessments and military historians revisiting the subject decades later. With propaganda like this, it is a wonder that Communism ever fell!!!! -read Schwarzkopf's account of the ARVN perspective on the US forces. It wasn't very flattering. Schwarzkopf, as an advisor for the Airborne brigade in the mid 1960s (it didn't expand to a division until later), shared the Airborne brigade's perspective on US forces. The US mission should have been more focused on training and advising the ARVN, and less on conducting their own operations. -naturally, some conventional US military didn't get COIN or FID, and had a negative view of the ARVN; much like the ARVN didn't think much of the combat effectiveness of many US military units Agree with this, most Pentagon assessments were very critical of US leadership, quality of manpower and of small-unit combat effectiveness and the officer corps performance, especially at the platoon and company level. This is what led to Abram's reforms that restructured the military to make overseas deployment difficult without a larger mobilisation of the professional military. For every US aircraft shot down in air to air combat, 3 North Vietnamese ones were. This was far worse than the US suffered against the Chinese and Soviet air forces 1950-1953. The North Vietnamese Air Force was Soviet and Chinese in all but name until 1968. Then there was the 4 year ban on air strikes on the North and on the South (imposed by the Soviets and Chinese for the same reason Johnson imposed a ban on bombing the North.) By 1972, the North had taken more control over their air force. Yes, but what accounts for the discrepancy; if it was Chinese pilots, then it doesn't make sense because as you point out, such an imbalance did not exist during the Korean war. I haven't seen any credible sources that claim or provide evidence that Soviet and Chinese pilots were the mainstay of the Northern airforce during the period you cite. It is sad that the USSR and Chinese bankrupted themselves supporting the North Vietnamese, causing great suffering on the part of their people. Er, I can tell you that is rubbish. The USSR embarked on an even more costly war in Afghanistan just a few years later and China was starting its massive growth upsurge in the late 70s. What was really creating problems for the Communist economies was the fact that the Soviet economy had basically stopped growing intensively by the end of the 1950s and was just relying on adding more factors of production and China had suffered massive reverses due to incompetent Maoist policies - interestingly it still managed to deliver (according to you phenomenol) levels of aid to the North despite these problems. Ironically, you completely overlook the massive dollar overhang and inflationary cycle that the war created for the US and its linked economies — actually by devaluing the dollar and ending the fixed-exchange rate system of Bretton Woods, the US actually displaced a good chunk of the war's cost onto the global economy (as pointed out by the Princeton economist Robert Triffin at the time). In recent public opinion polls, India was most popular large country for Afghans, mostly a reflexive response to Pakistan I think. In so far as these polls are reliable; I would say we are popular because of soft power (when I was in Kabul, most people could understand and speak Hindi and were keenly aware of the latest Bollywood movies!) and because we haven't engaged in any military form of backing as yet. Were we to do so, it would impact on our popularity. Do you have any evidence for this? Why don't you directly ask ANA combat advisers for 205th ANA Corps? Dude, stop being facetious; neither you or I am on the ground to see what is happening or speaking to the wide range of people involved who can give a composite picture. My evidence is based on the accounts I have already cited, which you have just chosen to ignore. I have. What is your source? Specifically ANA 1-205 (Kandahar) and 3-205 (Helmand.) I gave them, did you not read what I wrote. Two specific officers involved in OMLT operations have recounted problems that contradicted everything you wrote; I can go back and dig up which ANA formations they were with if you like. I am just looking over Stuart Tootal's account of the war, during his time as the CO of the British forces during 2006-7 and it supports many of these claims. My suspicion is that while Pashtuns are well represented among senior ANA officers, specific groups of Pashtuns are not. However, I am not smart enough to figure out what Pashtun tribes someone is from based on their name. Perhaps you could research this. I don't know how to ask this question without seeming uncouth. Do you have any ideas for how to determine this? The AREU has a paper by Brain Downing that looks at the ANA officer corps; at the level of battalion commander and above, PAshtuns are under-represented and Tajiks over-represented. It isn't available online but you can write to them and ask them for a hard copy or try and get it from an academic library. The ANA trains 2nd Lieutenants through another program for all of 20 weeks per recruit. However this program only started up recently. As a result there were very few 2nd Lieutenants trained between 2001 and 2006. Doug Beattie would have been right to criticize the ANA in 2006. The ANA also use to have a 40% AWOL rate back then, in part because the pay was so bad and irregular that ANA soldiers needed second jobs to support their families. Remember that the ANA budget in 2006 was about $240 million. This is for a country of over 3 crore people (over 30 million) that is as large as Pakistan. The official AWOL rate has fallen from 40% to about 5% based on the latest data from early this month. I shared with you my skepticism about the 5% number. However, by any measure, ANA AWOL rates are amazingly low under the circumstances. Ok, so now your arguement is that the ANA were poor in 2001-2006 but now barely 3 years later have improved significantly? So you accept that AWOL rates were 40% but then you cite a 5% figure which you yourself say you don't have any confidence in and then you jump forward to saying that AWOL rates are 'amazingly low'?! We have an accepted high AWOL rate of 40% and a dubious figure of 5% currently and from this we must draw the conclusion that AWOL rates are 'amazingly low'? Excuse me if I don't share your confidence. Hezbollah: I think the objective of both sides was to inflict heavy losses on the other. Both succeeded. I would argue that the IDF performed better in 2006 than it had ever fought before. The problem was that Hezbollah also fought very well. No this is quite wrong; Israeli war aims were quite clearly stated — they wanted to destroy Hezbollah's capacity to function effectively and pressurise them into giving up the two IDF soldiers they had kidnapped — a sensitive point for Israel which goes to extreme lengths to recover any of its citizens/soldiers captured by hostile forces. It achieved neither of these aims and was definitely not regarded even as a qualified victory inside Israel — it created a serious political problem for Omert and led to the resignation of the Israeli Chief of Staff Halutz (though the stock scandal played a role here as well). Polls (and we can take these polls seriously) indicated that most Israelis wanted Olmert to resign due to the handling of the war and the UN ceasefire was not delivered to Israeli terms, which demanded an unconditional ceasefire with the return of the two kidnapped IDF personnel — this did not happen and was a major slap in the face for Israel, which usually managed to end conflicts on its own terms. The Winograd Commission very clearly states that Israel did not managed to achieve a 'well-defined military victory' and that Hezbollah scored a major propaganda coup by its performance and forced Israel to back down from its stated objectives (despite the high cost).
Conrad, do you have Omar's e-mail address? If so, you might want to e-mail him so that we can get in touch. You are one of very few who are interested in detailed information; for which I give you credit. I read many books on the ARVN in the 1990s and don't have ready access to them. As a result my knowledge of the ARVN is rusty and from the pre google days. Would you be interested in a list of books I could suggest? Another idea, if you are interested, would be to visit some ARVN message boards and directly ask them questions I assume meeting actual ARVN vets isn't practical for you? The elite ARVN units were 18 Ranger brigades (4.5 divisions worth), the Airborne Division, and the Marine Division. I suspect that if you google search them, you will find many accounts of them; almost all positive. In fact, the best units to fight on all sides of the many South East Asian wars were the 313,000 South Korean soldiers. They were rambos :-) The 200,000 Vietcong and NVA who flipped and joined the South Vietnamese forces is reported in many sources and I think a google search could pull it up. Actually, this is not surprising. The atheistic communists oppressed religious North Vietnamese, and were often accused by Southern propaganda of being Chinese puppets. [Vietnamese historically did not like Chinese.] Many NVA had relatives in the ARVN. In many cases they were draftees sent far from home under horrendous conditions to fight in alien villages surrounded by hostile locals. If the draftee ARVN divisions and invaded the North, I suspect they would have had similar problems. ;-) Both the South and the North had many nationalist heroes that were admired by millions. They have an amazing culture and history. Both of them liked Israel and Israelis . . . I think . . . liked them ;-) They were alike but different. About 4 to 5 million North Vietnamese had fled the repression of the North Vietnamese Politburo to the South. They were more patriotic for the South then the most patriotic Southerners. On the other hand some South Vietnamese rural tribes allied with the North Vietnamese Politburo. Both sides had effective IO operations against each other (at least Vietnamese language IO in the case of the South.) And both sides were incredibly cruel to the other. And both sides are horrified at themselves for being so cruel. On Hezbollah; yes the Israelis messed up their public pronouncements. They should have stated that their aim was to damage and degrade Hezbollah. More importantly they shouldn't have bombed Lebanon so extensively. The US Air Force was horrified by what the Israelis had done. They had never done anything comparable in Iraq. Secretary of State Condi was shocked when she toured the areas Israel bombed. The US military and Rumsfeld asked Bush to stop the Israelis because PM Maliki, the Iraqi Government, Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police backed Nasrallah. The fact that the Iraqi resistance [sunni arab militias at the time] was so openly anti Nasrallah increased Iraqi popular support for Hezbollah. Nasrallah was a long time friend of PM Maliki and many of the Najaf Marjas. How interested in the ANSF are you? You can see some of my comments here: http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/11/25/ana-turnover/ Remember that when the Taliban surrendered there were 326 US special forces, 147 CIA officers, and some other assorted NATO, Turkish, Iranian, Russian and Indian special forces in Afghanistan assisting the Afghan resistance against the Taliban. For many years, Rumsfeld and Cheney capped US troops in Afghanistan at 5,000; later raised with great reluctance to 8,000. Rumsfeld and Cheney refused to train, fund or equip the ANP, demanding that Afghans and other countries do it. They also greatly limited US contributions to the ANA. This is why the ANA only had a 240 million budget in 2006; why so many ANA were not paid on time, and why AWOL rates were close to 40%. There has been a dramatic improvement in the quality of the ANSF since 2006. AWOL rates as of early this month were 5%. ANA soldiers are now paid on time, and they are no longer almost completely armed with junk. Unfortunately, the ANP is 4-5 years behind the ANA. At the beginning of 2008, there were only 3,000 trained ANP in Afghanistan. I don't think articles on the ANA in 2006 have much relevance today. Back then the ANA still hadn't trained post 2001 officers. Do you have any more recent sources? What is the date of "AREU has a paper by Brain Downing that looks at the ANA officer corps; at the level of battalion commander and above, PAshtuns are under-represented and Tajiks over-represented"? I have other reports on the ANA that state otherwise. To be sure Tajiks are slightly over represented. However about 40% of all ANA commissioned officers and soldiers are Pashtuns. And anecdotally, many top officers in the 205th ANA Corps in the South are Pashtuns. In fact, one question Afghans often ask is why so many Pakistanis believe that Pashtuns are not well represented in their top ANSF officers, politicians and civilian ministry leaders, when this perception is so demonstrably false. Can anyone from this blog answer this question? In every public opinion poll taken since 2001, the ANA is by far the most popular Afghan institution, including among Pashtuns. I think openly training, equipping and advising them will not harm the popularity of the country that does this, whether it be NATO, Iran, South Korea, China or India. Military involvement is not as unpopular among Afghans as you think, unless the Afghan people think a foreign country is supporting violent attacks against their beloved ANA. Many Southern Pashtuns believe that NATO secretly backs the Taliban against their ANA; and this causes a lot of anger among Pashtuns.
1) I agree about the RoK troops they were/are very good; arguably the best to participate in that conflict. I am not disputing that the ARVN didn't improve its performance by the end of the war; imo this was just too late in the day and too dependent on the US. 2) I will look up that desertion rates on the VC and the NVA, I just haven't come across that figure before. 3) I agree about Vietnamese nationalism and the civil war; however we can't get away from the fact that the Communists were the most credible political organisation left after WWII and the French- Indo-China war; mainly again because of nationalism. Had Diem allowed elections to be held in 56 and a referendum on reunification as the Geneva accords stipulated, then the Communists would have won and Vietnam been reunified. Also don't underestimate the popularity of land reform — the fact that the North managed to carry this out effectively in the North, had a huge impact on peasant populations in the South and in no small measure accounted for the fact why so many villages went over to the Communists. The key social group in most Asian countries is the middle peasantry — whichever side can mobilise this group effectively has a very good chance of winning any war. The North was far superior in this regard than the South. The US military and Rumsfeld asked Bush to stop the Israelis because PM Maliki, the Iraqi Government, Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police backed Nasrallah. I don't buy this arguement, mainly because since Eisenhower stopped the Suez war, no Us admin has put serious pressure on an Israeli govt at war and no Israeli govt has listened. I am not sure that Bush even really tried, certainly Condi et al. Were doing their utmost to act as international cheerleaders for the Israeli invasion. The decision to stop and withdraw was because Israel was realising that it wasn't accomplishing its aim and being bogged down again in Southern Lebanon — a nightmare scenario for its military planners and exactly what they promised the public wouldn't happen. For many years, Rumsfeld and Cheney capped US troops in Afghanistan at 5,000; later raised with great reluctance to 8,000. Rumsfeld and Cheney refused to train, fund or equip the ANP, demanding that Afghans and other countries do it. They also greatly limited US contributions to the ANA. This is why the ANA only had a 240 million budget in 2006; why so many ANA were not paid on time, and why AWOL rates were close to 40%. There has been a dramatic improvement in the quality of the ANSF since 2006. AWOL rates as of early this month were 5%. ANA soldiers are now paid on time, and they are no longer almost completely armed with junk. Yes, I agree with this, though spending accelerated in the last year of Bush's regime. But this article claims a much higher AWOL rate amongst the ANA, part of the problem is that salaries are still too low compared with what fighters can earn working for drug militias or the Taliban; so unless they are improved, even paying them on time may not have the desired effect. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KK26Df01.html I don't think articles on the ANA in 2006 have much relevance today. Back then the ANA still hadn't trained post 2001 officers. Do you have any more recent sources? That is a very fair point, I am reading some now - the problem as you can imagine is that journal article and books tend to have a 1-2 year lag at the best of times so are a bit behind. The second Beattie book though refers to 2007; currently I am looking at several ones that are based on 2008. Remember that when the Taliban surrendered there were 326 US special forces, 147 CIA officers, and some other assorted NATO, Turkish, Iranian, Russian and Indian special forces in Afghanistan assisting the Afghan resistance against the Taliban. Yes, I agree with this, a common criticism of the time was the dearth of troops and fighting done by the US on the ground during the 2001 invasion — but how could it be otherwise, the admin was too excited to get into Iraq, Afghanistan was just an unwelcome distraction for them. This is the first time that I have heard that Indian Special forces were active in this operation — what is the source for this claim? What is the date of “AREU has a paper by Brain Downing that looks at the ANA officer corps; at the level of battalion commander and above, PAshtuns are under-represented and Tajiks over-represented”? I have other reports on the ANA that state otherwise. To be sure Tajiks are slightly over represented. However about 40% of all ANA commissioned officers and soldiers are Pashtuns. And anecdotally, many top officers in the 205th ANA Corps in the South are Pashtuns. Downing's paper came out in early 2009 (March/May I think) I would be sceptical of the assertion that many top officers in the 205 corps, who actually directly command combat formations are 40% Pashtun. In every public opinion poll taken since 2001, the ANA is by far the most popular Afghan institution, including among Pashtuns. I think openly training, equipping and advising them will not harm the popularity of the country that does this, whether it be NATO, Iran, South Korea, China or India. Could you point me to some of these polls please, I remain sceptical. And being 'the most popular Afghan institution' means what exactly when most such state institutions are not well regarded and have a low legitimacy? Military involvement is not as unpopular among Afghans as you think, unless the Afghan people think a foreign country is supporting violent attacks against their beloved ANA. Actually, I think people are much more self-centred than this — what upsets them is when a foreign country is seen to be supporting violent attacks against THEM ie the local civilian population, not some armed force that has only existed for a few years and is entirely foreign funded and support and wouldn't exist otherwise — which is what the ANA is. Many Southern Pashtuns believe that NATO secretly backs the Taliban against their ANA; and this causes a lot of anger among Pashtuns. Okay, come on now, mate, you are pulling my leg again; this is on par with your people thought the US was secretly in bed with the Communists during the Vietnam war claim!!! Give it a rest , guvnor! Conrad, do you have Omar's e-mail address? If so, you might want to e-mail him so that we can get in touch. I don't know who Omar is but if you want, you can look me up on FB, if that doesn't work I will post my email address. Should save us cluttering up Manan's blog ;)
What is FB. Would like to touch base via e-mail. Whether it is rational or not, many Afghans "DO" believe that the US supports the Taliban. Ask ISAF soldiers on the ground this question directly. Similarly, the ARVN rank and file thought America was in bed with the communists. Remember that many hundreds of thousands of ARVN were killed by the NVA . . . causing a great deal of sorrow, emotion and anger on the part of many ARVN. The ARVN hated the NVA and were looking for conspiracy theories to explain how the NVA was able to kill so many of their fellow soldiers. I am aware of 4 public opinion polls taken this year, plus many more taken in prior years. I could share some of these by e-mail. Bush didn't follow the advise of the US military during the Israel Hezbollah war. The US did apply pressure on Israel in 1967, 1973 and 1982 during Israeli wars. However, the Soviet nuclear threat might have had more influence than US pressure. ;-) The South Vietnamese also conducted large scale land reform. US aid did facilitate quite a bit of economic growth in the 1960s and early 1970s. However, South Vietnam entered an economic depression during the oil shock in 1973, exacerbated by the US cutting off aid. Ho Chi Minh had quite a bit of popularity in the mid 1950s. So did Diem, a nationalist who had resisted the French. However, Ho might have beaten him in a national election in 1956. However, both South and North lost legitimacy by becoming so dependent on foreign powers. It is far from clear who would have won an election in the 1960s or 1970s. Suspect the South would have won in the South and the North would have won in the North. But the margins of victories are far from clear.
Whether it is rational or not, many Afghans “DO” believe that the US supports the Taliban. Ask ISAF soldiers on the ground this question directly. Ok, have never heard this claim before, do you have any published sources on this? All the accounts by ISAF soldiers who have served in Afghanistan do not mention this at all, the reverse if anything. Similarly, the ARVN rank and file thought America was in bed with the communists. Remember that many hundreds of thousands of ARVN were killed by the NVA . . . causing a great deal of sorrow, emotion and anger on the part of many ARVN. The ARVN hated the NVA and were looking for conspiracy theories to explain how the NVA was able to kill so many of their fellow soldiers. Yeah, but that is all it was a conspiracy theory by a losing side that didn't want to admit its own faults and problems. I don't think many people seriously thought this, never seen credible evidence otherwise. The bitter remembrances of soldiers who lost and then fled the country aren't the most reliable sources on this — a bit like basing your opinion of Cuba by sampling what Cuban Americans in Florida think about the regime. Not going to give you a balanced or realistic picture imo. Bush didn't follow the advise of the US military during the Israel Hezbollah war. The US did apply pressure on Israel in 1967, 1973 and 1982 during Israeli wars. However, the Soviet nuclear threat might have had more influence than US pressure. ;-) US Pressure didn't really exist in 1967 — you can look at the standard histories of the war, even Oren's pro-Israeli version won't support this. The war was over so quickly and Israel accomplished what it wanted so rapidly, it didn't make much difference. In 73, the US had more influence because of the massive airlift it carried out for the Israelis but again, Israel accomplished rolling back the Arab armies before it bothered to listen. As for Lebanon, that isn't true, US negotiators got embarrassed several times by repeatedly getting the Israelis to limit the conflict or not take any action, only to subsequently see the IDF go ahead and ignore these anyway. The withdrawal was caused by the fact that the IDF were losing too many soldiers and not being able to impose a friendly regime in Beirut after Jumblatt's assassination. The South Vietnamese also conducted large scale land reform. US aid did facilitate quite a bit of economic growth in the 1960s and early 1970s. However, South Vietnam entered an economic depression during the oil shock in 1973, exacerbated by the US cutting off aid. No, Southern land reforms were compromised by being co-opted by the village elites, unlike earlier land reforms in RoK and Taiwan. There are two well known studies on this, the first was an internal Army study, “The Programme for the Pacification and Long-term Development of South Vietnam”, and William Lederer's “Our Own Worst Enemy” both of which looked at the village development schemes and land reform efforts of the 1960s. I still recommend Samuel Popkin's excellent study of peasant society “The Rational Peasant” which outlines very concisely the kind of calculations peasants made in deciding which side to support and how to react in the conflict. Ho Chi Minh had quite a bit of popularity in the mid 1950s. So did Diem, a nationalist who had resisted the French. However, Ho might have beaten him in a national election in 1956. However, both South and North lost legitimacy by becoming so dependent on foreign powers. It is far from clear who would have won an election in the 1960s or 1970s. Suspect the South would have won in the South and the North would have won in the North. But the margins of victories are far from clear. Well, most assessments indicate that the majority would have voted for reunification in the 50s and that Ho Chi Min and the Communists were the most popular organisation; hence the reluctance of the South and the US to hold the elections. As for the Southern elections, well we will never know, considering the rigging that went on but it isn't a good sign that not Southern govt could command enough legitimacy to hold relatively free and fair elections to test its support. FB = facebook
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