Comments on: Tribalizing Afghanistan

By: Conrad Barwa

Conrad Barwa — Fri, 30 Oct 2009 12:26:04 +0000

Good points Q, I think the difference is though here that the implementation of such a strategy would destroy the social unity and bonds of the political community where it would be implemented – imo, this was a desirable aim of state strategy in India because autonomous political adivasi communities are hugely marginalised from the mainstream and are often viewed as threats that need to be neutralised or destroyed at little political cost to the rest of lowland society. The ethnic otherness and cultural separation of many adivasi communities makes this a viable strategy in India. For the NWFP, it isn’t because tribal society there is much more cohesive and stronger, has a longer tradition of armed resistance and because of the common factor of Islam they can count on political support and mobilisation from other parts of Pakistani society as well as on a shared religious tradition. Adivasi appeals on this basis, as seen in the most recent mining case involving Vedanta, just fall on deaf ears.

By: Qalandar

Qalandar — Thu, 29 Oct 2009 23:42:43 +0000

Apart from the examples you mentioned, it could also be applied in parts of Maharashtra — not exactly in its Chattisgarh contours, but remember that something not very unlike this was used in the late 1990s in Kashmir too (they called it village defense committees or some such thing), and is being used in a very different social context (i.e. a very different “tribal” ethos) in Pakistan’s NWFP as well. So the fact that the shoe doesn’t fit precisely wouldn’t dissuade the state machinery if it was otherwise convinced. My reading is that had some of the states you mention been enthusiastic about the Salwa Judum approach, some variant of it would have been applied (at the time the approach was launched, it was not sold as a Chattisgarh-only approach IMO); but that the massive internal displacement in Chattisgarh and other forms of violence have dulled enthusiasm for it. At least partly for this reason, the new “approach” seems to be to federalize the whole thing (using the usual excuses, such as that the states aren’t well-equipped to tackle the security issues, etc. etc. One can’t forget that four of the six relevant states aren’t Congress-ruled, and somehow state-level powerlessness wasn’t used much as an excuse when it was a Congress government in Andhra that was doing the armed counter-insurgency).

Anyways, we’re straying off the main point: i.e., even if you disagree with my interpretation, you seem to be disagreeing in the direction of my original point — that experience with this sort of thing elsewhere in the sub-continent shows that this is not a good idea. And, given (among others) the already highly militarized Pashtun zone between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and a highly fluid and chaotic situation, I can’t think of a worse area for one to implement this sort of policy in. i.e., I don’t think it will do “a pretty good job of cleaving the … support base” in the NWFP: on the Pakistani side, that support base is already somewhat cleaved as between insurgents and the very large number of Pashtuns in the Pakistani army itself; that hasn’t stopped or slowed the entrenchment of the insurgency, and adding an extra layer wouldn’t help. Stated differently, for the reasons fpfj notes above, the NWFP is a LESS “traditional” society today (because of what has happened over the last three decades — with the exception of the Great Lakes region, where else has the social fabric been rent so badly and for so long as here?) than even the likes of the “tribal” societies of Chattisgarh etc…

By: Conrad Barwa

Conrad Barwa — Thu, 29 Oct 2009 16:00:38 +0000

I don’t deny the “efficacy”, my point was that the bloody nature has dulled enthusiasm for extending the model to other states — so far we haven’t seen it outside Chattisgarh

Where would it be applicable though, outside Chattisgarh? There aren’t isolated, concentrated adivasi communities in any other state that are the basis for Naxalite activity on this scale – the only exception I can think of is Jharkhand and their the advasis are split along different political lines and the number of dikus is much higher and more settled than in Chattisgarh. Orissa is another partial exception, at least the interior belt is, but there isn’t the same level of Naxalite activity here. Bengal and Andhra Pradesh are possible cases but I think the adivasi community is more integrated in those states and the Naxalites depend a lot more on landless labourers and the struggle over land as well as caste than they do on ethnic identity.

This solution only works when applied to an insurgency that has its social base amongst an adivasi population; other methods will be used for different situations.

By: Qalandar

Qalandar — Thu, 29 Oct 2009 15:13:36 +0000

I don’t deny the “efficacy”, my point was that the bloody nature has dulled enthusiasm for extending the model to other states — so far we haven’t seen it outside Chattisgarh, and I have no doubt that those who thought this was a great idea in the first place would likely not have thought of it as chattisgarh-only “solution”. i.e., even granting that the state machinery deems certain sorts of costs more acceptable than others, that does not preclude the notion that the associated political costs can nevertheless rise to a high enough level as to make wider extension of the course of action more difficult…

By: Conrad Barwa

Conrad Barwa — Wed, 28 Oct 2009 19:28:53 +0000

Q – I dunno, the salwa judum strategy did a pretty good job of cleaving the adivasi support base of the Naxalites in Chattisgarh and stopped its expansion. Of course it was bloody but since most of those being killed were adivasis, peasants or low ranking policemen this would hardly be deemed a high cost by the Indian state.

This strategy was used to great effect to suppress quasi-ethno-nationalist type revolts by the British during the Mau Mau; where the turning point is accepted to be the arming and creation of the Home Guard, that split Kikiyu society into opposing factions.

By: fpfj

fpfj — Mon, 26 Oct 2009 17:27:46 +0000

I argue that the militias are less ‘tribal’ and more group of men from same ethnic group. There is a difference. Tribes have a hierarchy, set of customs and order. For example, one can speak to a tribal elder and can be assured that the rest of the tribe will usually follow. I believe that the civil war has effectively broken down the tribes and what we have now are ethnic-based militias. This means that the U.S. and her allies are re-arming groups of people that are less likely to promote political stability. This is more like re-arming the mafia, then actually re-arming tribes (also, they were never dis-armed in the first place).

By: AIG

AIG — Thu, 15 Oct 2009 19:20:06 +0000

Hitchens has a good idea. http://www.slate.com/id/2201622/

what’s Musharraf up to? Obama should anoint him king of Af-Pak.

By: Qalandar

Qalandar — Thu, 15 Oct 2009 17:35:11 +0000

Far from trying to move beyond “tribalization”, the governments of the region (i.e. even outside Afghanistan) are trying to replicate this model, in Pakistan’s NWFP, and in India’s Chattisgarh. In both countries the notion that counter-insurgency can be usefully “outsourced” has gained ground. The bloody results in Chattisgarh have perhaps dulled enthusiasm for extending this “model” to other states, but it is a scandal that it is being perpetuated in so many places…